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THE FEDERAL RULES AT 75: DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OR 
DECISIONS ACCORDING TO LAW? 
James R. Maxeiner* 
ABSTRACT 
This essay is a critical response to the 2013 commemorations of the 
75th anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were introduced in 1938 to 
provide procedure to decide cases on their merits. The Rules were 
designed to replace decisions under the “sporting theory of justice” 
with decisions according to law. By 1976, at midlife, it was clear that 
they were not achieving their goal. America’s proceduralists split into 
two sides about what to do. 
One side promotes rules that control and conclude litigation: e.g., 
plausibility pleading, case management, limited discovery, cost 
indemnity for discovery, and summary judgment (“dispute 
resolution”). The other side defends rules that open litigation to 
investigation of possible rights: e.g., notice pleading, open and free 
discovery, and limited summary judgment (“private enforcement”). 
Both sides focus on process. They overlook the essential goal of civil 
justice the world over: “to apply the applicable substantive law to the 
established facts in an impartial manner, and pronounce fair and 
accurate judgments.”1 They forget decisions according to law. 
Abroad we can see systems of civil justice that work, if only we 
would look. Whereas the heroes of American civil justice, David 
Dudley Field, Jr., Roscoe Pound, Edmund C. Clark, and Edson D. 
Sunderland, looked abroad for solutions, today’s proceduralists from 
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 1. Alan Uzelac, Goals of Civil Justice and Civil Procedure in the Contemporary World, 34 IUS 
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the private enforcement side tell us to avert our eyes from foreign 
systems. Why? Supposedly our system in its goals is exceptional. In 
fact, it is not. We could and should learn from others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 outfitted American 
civil justice with tools to apply law to facts. They were an attempt to 
banish overly contentious litigation (the “‘sporting theory of 
justice’”).2 Applying law to facts is fundamental to civil justice. Civil 
lawsuits resolve disputes between parties by determining legal rights 
and duties. By enforcing law, they make civil life possible in mass 
society. 
The Federal Rules were not, however, a comprehensive reform of 
civil justice. They were limited to rules of court. 3  Although they 
bestowed on courts new power and authority to apply law to facts, they 
left key aspects of civil justice (e.g., court organization, jurisdiction, 
costs, appeals) unaltered.4 They created no new institutions, such as a 
ministry of justice, which might have helped to make reform reality. 
They brought with them no codification of substantive law, such as 
David Dudley Field, Jr. sought when he led America’s last major 
attempt to rationalize procedure.5 Old ways persisted. 
When the Federal Rules went into effect September 16, 1938, judges 
and lawyers did not change their practices.6 Although judges had new 
powers and authority to formulate issues, they did not make much use 
of them. Although lawyers had new powers and authority to reach 
together the real issues between the parties, they rarely cooperated to 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
287, 290 & n.14 (2010). 
 3. See James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative 
Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 1261–
62 (2010); Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What 
Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 360–61 (1987). 
 4. Elwood Hutcheson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 198, 
198–99 (1938). 
 5. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 389–92 (2010). 
 6. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers 
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1907–08 (1989). 
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do that. When eventually lawyers did use their new powers and 
authority, they acted not to streamline trials, but to unearth new causes 
and to conduct pretrial inquiries.7 Applying law to fact receded as a 
goal of the Rules. Parties settled, not because the merits were against 
them, but because process costs and risks were too great. 8  Trials 
vanished. 
By 1976, serious problems were apparent.9 Proceduralists fractured 
into two sides that continue to this day. One side focuses on resolving 
disputes; 10  the other focuses on social goals through private 
enforcement of public law.11 Debates about revisions of the Federal 
Rules are about process and not about making decisions according to 
law. The former side restores the spirit of the sporting theory of justice 
and rewards zealous advocates;12 the latter emulates the endless equity 
proceedings that exhausted estates and benefited only solicitors. 13 
Neither side adequately accounts for the interests of litigants. 
Neither side addresses the essential goal of the Federal Rules, which 
is the need of the public: routine application of law to facts to 
determine rights and resolve disputes. Neither side considers 
comprehensive reform of civil justice which would overhaul the Rules 
and reach beyond to restructure the whole system. No wonder that 
there is again popular dissatisfaction with the administration of civil 
justice. 
The public’s goal is stated in Federal Rule 1: “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”14 The founders of the nation stated the same goal already 
in 1776 when they declared everyone “ought to have justice and right, 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and its Discontents, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 275, 286–87 (2008). 
 8. Id. (identifying the goals of federal litigation as evolving from “deciding cases on the merits to 
merely disposing of cases as expeditiously as possible”). 
 9. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 911–12, 974 (1987) (describing concerns over 
excessive costs and delays and discovery abuses raised at the 1976 Pound Conference). 
 10. Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “on the Merits”, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 408 (2010). 
 11. Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 7, at 291. 
 12. See Tidmarsh, supra note 10, at 408. 
 13. See Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 7, at 291. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without 
delay, according to the Law of the Land.”15 That declaration forms part 
of many state constitutions. 16  It is due process in the federal 
constitution.17 It is not a utopian goal but an attainable one. If only we 
would adopt modern legal methods. 
A way to that goal is before our eyes, but we do not look. Abroad 
we can see systems of civil justice that work. But whereas the heroes 
of American civil justice, David Dudley Field, Jr., Roscoe Pound, 
Edmund C. Clark, and Edson D. Sunderland, urged us to look abroad 
for solutions,18 today’s proceduralists tell us to avert our eyes.19 Why? 
They assert that our system is exceptional in its goals.20 This is that 
story. 
Part I reports dismay at the 75th anniversary commemorations: the 
Federal Rules do not work to routinely resolve cases justly, quickly, 
and inexpensively.21 Part II chronicles where we have been: how the 
Federal Rules were supposed to turn lawsuits from sporting contests 
into applications of law to facts to determine rights and how they are 
turning in a fourth era of civil procedure into dispute resolution.22 Part 
III relates the epic story of the attempt to use the Rules for private 
enforcement of social goals.23 Finally, Part IV points a way to return 
                                                                                                                 
 15. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19. Other states adopted similar declarations. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. 
pt. 1, art. 11 (“Every subject of the commonwealth . . . ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without 
being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; 
conformably to the laws.”). 
 16. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice 
administered without sale, denial or delay.”); R.I. CONST. art., 1 § 5 (“Every person ought to obtain right 
and justice freely, and without purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; 
conformably to the laws.”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law”). 
 18. Richard L. Marcus, Modes of Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 164 
(2008). 
 19. See infra note 235. 
 20. See, e.g., Richard Marcus, “American Exceptionalism” in Goals for Civil Litigation, 34 IUS 
GENTIUM 123, 139–40 (2014) [hereinafter Marcus, American Exceptionalism]. 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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to decisions on the merits by stripping away the blinders that keep us 
from learning from foreign civil systems that work well.24 
I.   REQUIEM FOR THE FEDERAL RULES AT 75? 
[H]ave the Rules in fact achieved the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action? 
Harold Koh (2013)25 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure turned seventy-five in 2013. 
Judges, lawyers and academics around the country celebrated. 26 
Above all, they extolled social uses of the Rules that have made it 
possible, in their view, for civil litigation to shape America. When the 
Rules were adopted in 1938, they were intended to govern routine 
dispute resolution.27 Today the Rules sometimes are put to work for 
private enforcement of public law norms, for making public policy, 
and even for creating new norms.28 These social uses are said to define 
the character of the American system of civil litigation.29 
Americans engaged in civil litigation either love the Federal Rules 
or hate them, depending mainly upon how they feel about the Rules’ 
social uses. Members of the profession who live by the rules—judges, 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. Harold H. Koh, Keynote Address: “The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every 
Action?”, 162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (emphasis added); see also Highlights From “The 
Federal Rules at 75”, UNIV. OF PA. LAW SCH. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/ 
2921-highlights-from-the-federal-rules-at-75#.U6OHJy-7ldI. I was present for both the keynote address 
and Professor Miller’s address and report these comments from my notes. 
 26. See, e.g., Law School Celebrates the 75th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
UNIV. OF CINCINNATI COLL. OF LAW, http://www.law.uc.edu/news/75th-anniversary-federal-rules-of-
civil-procedure (last visited Apr. 24, 2014); Renowned Scholar Arthur R. Miller and Distinguished Panel 
to Give 18th Annual Pedrick Lecture, “Revisiting the Rules: Celebrating 75 years of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure”, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR COLL. OF LAW (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.law.asu.edu/News/CollegeofLawNews/TabId/803/ArtMID/7835/ArticleID/4642. 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the 
United States district courts . . . . They should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
 28. Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 637, 667 (2013). 
 29. STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
CONTEXT 37 (2006). 
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lawyers and law professors—largely love them.30 Business people, 
who are subject to them, largely hate them.31 Both sides presume to 
speak for the public who are neither legal professionals nor 
businessmen and who encounter the Rules only sporadically. Because 
civil litigation in state courts is in the mold of the Federal Rules, 
judgments of the Federal Rules are judgments of civil procedure 
generally.32 
For professionals, the social uses of civil procedure are God’s work: 
the oppressed at long last have access to justice and to the levers of 
power.33 These social uses give meaning to their lives; they let them 
work to change society for the better. For businessmen, these “social” 
uses are the Devil’s doing: the clever exasperate the conscientious with 
frivolous and expensive lawsuits. 34  They confound legitimate 
commerce. 
The two sides demonize each other.35 One side sees no lawsuit 
besides those which are frivolous and whose costs are outrageous; it 
doubts the ethics of anyone who would promote such base behavior.36 
The other side sees no plaintiff’s plea that is other than proper and finds 
no price that is too high to pay for “justice”; it questions the conscience 
of anyone who would reject such claims of right and put a dollar value 
on justice.37 Both sides can point to thousands of cases that fit their 
respective views. 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Thinking About Civil Discovery in Alabama: Using the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as a Thinking Tool, 60 ALA. L. REV. 683, 685 (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., About ATRA, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 
24, 2014) (describing the costs of civil litigation and the economic impact to business). 
 32. Edgar B. Tolman, Foreword to ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE 
COURTS, at iv (1940) (“There is a growing tendency towards the assimilation of state practice to that of 
the Federal courts.”). 
 33. See, e.g., James A. Bamberger, Confirming the Constitutional Right of Meaningful Access to the 
Courts in Non-Criminal Cases in Washington State, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 383, 392–94 (2005) 
(discussing the fundamental right of individuals to have open access to courts). 
 34. See About ATRA, supra note 31. 
 35. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two 
Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1754 (2013). 
 36. Id. at 1757–59. 
 37. Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 598–99 (2011); see also How Our Civil Justice 
System Protects Consumers, PUB. CITIZEN (Apr. 29, 2002), http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_ 
redirect.cfm?ID=7545. 
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Neither side, however, addresses the millions of cases that do not fit 
either viewpoint. These are cases of people who do not vocalize about 
the Federal Rules. These people are the ninety-nine percent. They have 
no goal in mind loftier than routine dispute resolution according to law. 
They are the people who, when they have a claim against a careless 
contractor or a cash poor customer, think that the legal system should 
uphold their rights and return to them their claims without deduction. 
They are the people who, when they are sued, think that they should 
have a day in court to voice their views. They are the people who, when 
they are fired by their employers, think that they should have a chance 
to challenge the grounds for termination. These people are left out of 
the conversation altogether. Often, they give up without ever taking 
their cases to court. These people cast a pall on the revelries of the 
Federal Rules at seventy-five. 
At a Pennsylvania conference, keynote speaker, proceduralist, and 
internationalist, Professor Harold Koh, asked the uncomfortable 
question: Have the Federal Rules achieved their goals: the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action? 38  Koh, the former 
diplomat and law school dean, was too polite to say no. He answered 
his question: “only partially.”39 Others were not so gentle. Professor 
Arthur R. Miller, who for litigators is practically synonymous with the 
Federal Rules (as joint author of the treatise on the Federal Rules, 
“Wright & Miller,” as former rules reporter for the Advisory 
Committee for Civil Rules, and as premier proponent of social uses of 
the rules),40 gave a less than stellar grade: “at best, B minus, and on an 
inflated grade curve, that’s below the median.”41 
Other participants at other commemorations were less buoyant. At 
a University of Michigan celebration of Federal Rules Advisory 
Committee Reporter Ed Cooper, Paul V. Niemeyer, judge on the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Koh, supra note 25; see also Highlights From “The Federal Rules at 75”, supra note 25. I 
was present for both the keynote address and Professor Miller’s address and report these comments from 
my notes. 
 39. Koh, supra note 25. 
 40. Arthur R. Miller, Biography, N.Y. UNIV. LAW SCH., https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile. 
cfm?section=bio&personID=20130 (last visited June 11, 2014). 
 41. Highlights From “The Federal Rules at 75”, supra note 25. I was present for both the keynote 
address and Professor Miller’s address and report these comments from my notes. 
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and former chairman of the Federal 
Rules Advisory Committee, despaired: “Unfortunately, any objective 
evaluation of current federal civil process will inevitably lead to the 
conclusion that the process is functioning inadequately in its purpose 
of discharging justice speedily and inexpensively.” 42  Professor 
Burbank, the host of the Pennsylvania celebration, in a joint paper 
presented concurrently with his party, painted a depressing picture: 
“[T]he federal courts [are] unattractive to business and inaccessible to 
the middle class.”43 For the poor, there is no “functioning federal civil 
legal aid system worthy of the name.”44 
Today Americans doubt whether the Federal Rules can ever achieve 
the objective of securing “the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”45 In 2013, the Federal 
Rules Advisory Committee proposed that Rule 1 be amended to 
provide, not just that the rules be “interpreted and administered” to 
achieve these goals, but that they actually be so “employed by the court 
and the parties.”46 Already four years before, the American College of 
Trial Lawyers counseled ratcheting down Rule 1’s goals to seeking 
“reasonably prompt, reasonably efficient, reasonably affordable 
resolution.”47 
This is not what the public expects. It is not what it expected in 1938 
when the Federal Rules took effect. At the time, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 
President of the American Bar Association, reported: “If these new 
Rules are intelligently and liberally administered by the United States 
District Judges, with a view to promoting the administration of justice 
in the interest of litigants, there will indeed be a new dawn in the 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Paul V. Niemeyer, Is Now the Time for Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 673, 673 (2013). 
 43. Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 28, at 650. 
 44. Id. at 653. 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 46. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 281 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 47. PAUL C. SAUNDERS ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE 
OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (2009). 
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judicial history of this country.”48 Lawyers forgot law and litigants. 
Dawn has turned to dusk. 
II.   CHRONICLES OF THE FEDERAL RULES 
The aim is stated in the deathless prose of Rule 1 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as the achievement of “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive” resolution of civil disputes. 
Paul D. Carrington (1995)49 
A.   Prologue 
Most chronicles of the Federal Rules begin in August 1906 when 
Roscoe Pound, then the Dean of the University of Nebraska College 
of Law, addressed the annual meeting of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) on the topic: “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice.”50 It is among the most famous addresses 
ever given to American lawyers.51 Pound’s speech resonated because 
the public was dissatisfied with civil justice.52 
In his 1906 address, Pound diagnosed causes of dissatisfaction. He 
did not prescribe cures. But he did not limit his diagnosis to civil 
procedure: he looked at the legal system and its methods generally. 
Among the chief causes he counted: (1) private prosecution;53 (2) the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Foreword to Reports of the Section of Judicial Administration, 63 ANNU. 
REP. A.B.A. 500, 519 (1938). 
 49. Paul D. Carrington, In Memoriam: Maurice Rosenberg, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (1995). 
 50. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of the Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 395, 395 (1906). 
 51. See generally John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s St. Paul Address of 1906: The Spark That 
Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 176 (1937). 
 52. See id. at 178. For a list of some of the criticisms as they continued through the years, see JAMES 
R. MAXEINER ET AL., FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 287–99 
(2011). 
 53. Pound, supra note 50, at 403 (“Private prosecution has become obsolete.”). Common law methods 
failed to keep government and public utilities in line. They did not protect employees or consumers. See 
3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 343–44 (1959). 
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“sporting theory of justice”;54 (3) judicial supremacy;55 (4) case law in 
an era calling for legislation;56 (5) backward procedure;57 (6) archaic 
court organization;58 and (7) putting courts into politics.59 
Despite initial opposition, the ABA mounted several programs of 
reform that responded to Pound’s critiques. 60  The reform that 
eventually led to the Federal Rules sought transfer of authority for 
making rules of court in cases at law from Congress to the Supreme 
Court.61 As broad as was Pound’s diagnosis, the ABA program was 
narrow. Its principal goal was not civil justice or even civil procedure 
reform. It was the creation of uniform rules for suits at law (not even 
equity) in federal courts to replace use of state procedure in federal 
courts.62 The struggle, nevertheless, took more than twenty years.63 
Through these many years, the debate was about enabling the Supreme 
Court to issue court rules.64 Most everyone assumed that the rules 
created would be good ones. 
In 1934, Congress finally adopted the Rules Enabling Act. 65 
Pursuant to that Act, the Supreme Court chose Charles E. Clark, Dean 
of Yale Law School, to head up the project.66 Clark picked Edson R. 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Pound, supra note 50, at 405 (“The idea that procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious 
disfigures our judicial administration at every point.”). The question should not be, “[w]hat do substantive 
law and justice require?,” but here it is, “[h]ave the rules of the game been carried out strictly?” Id. at 406. 
 55. Id. at 407. American courts make public policy decisions as incidents of private litigation. Id. 
“[C]ourts are held for what should be the work of the legislature.” Id. at 408. 
 56. Id. at 408, 415. Case law, Pound wrote, is inherently uncertain, confusing, incomplete, and bulky. 
The times called for the development of law through legislation; yet American legislation was crude and 
unorganized. 
 57. Id. at 408. American courts decide cases on points of practice leading to “[u]ncertainty, delay and 
expense, and above all . . . injustice.” Id. 
 58. Id. at 411–12. Rigid and yet overlapping jurisdictional lines (e.g., diversity) waste judicial 
resources and delay decisions of cases on their merits. “It ought to be impossible for a cause to fail because 
brought in the wrong place.” Id. at 412. “Even more archaic is our system of concurrent 
jurisdiction . . . involving diversity of citizenship.” Id. at 411. 
 59. Id. at 415 (“Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become politicians, in many 
jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the Bench.”). 
 60. See generally Austin W. Scott, Pound’s Influence on Civil Procedure, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1568 
(1965). 
 61. Id. at 1573. 
 62. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1054 (1982). 
 63. Id. at 1097. 
 64. Id. at 1078 (describing a debate in the Judiciary Committee where proponents of the Rules defined 
what powers the Supreme Court would have to make rules regarding practice and procedure). 
 65. 28 U.S.C § 2072 (2012). 
 66. Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A Brief and Belated but Fond Farewell, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
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Sunderland, professor at the University of Michigan School of Law, as 
chief assistant.67 Sunderland was principal draftsman of the pretrial 
provisions that became the most controversial features of the Federal 
Rules.68 
In 1934, on the eve of the adoption of the Enabling Act, and before 
being picked to draft the Federal Rules, Sunderland set out a 
prescription for reform. Just as Pound diagnosed the whole of civil 
justice, so Sunderland prescribed almost as broadly: “the business of 
the courts,” “effectiveness of court organization,” and “adequacy of 
court procedure.”69 Under adequacy of court procedure, Sunderland 
included proposals for “ascertaining and defining the dispute” and 
“trying the dispute.”70 Both anticipate Sunderland’s work to turn civil 
procedure toward decisions on the merits and according to law. 
B.   Clark and Sunderland’s Goal: Decisions According to Law 
(1938) 
Dean Clark and Professor Sunderland authored the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure of 1938.71 The Rules are intended, states Rule 1, “to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”72 They were designed, Clark wrote soon after their adoption, 
to be a “simple and flexible system of procedural steps wherein the 
merits of the case are at all times stressed.”73 “[T]he rules are good or 
bad,” wrote Sunderland, “in proportion to the contribution which they 
                                                                                                                 
1323, 1323 (1965). 
 67. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 714 (1998) [hereinafter Subrin, Fishing Expeditions]. 
 68. Id. (identifying Sunderland as the drafter of the provisions on summary judgment and discovery). 
 69. Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 60, 60–70 (1933). Systematization of substantive law was the principal omission from 
Sunderland’s prescription. 
 70. Id. at 73–80. The other two points—only tangentially included in the Federal Rules—were 
“obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant” and “obtaining a review.” Id. at 70–73, 80–82. 
 71. Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 
6, 6 (1959). 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 73. Charles E. Clark, The Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 NEB. L. REV. 307, 308 (1942); see 
also Peter Julian, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism of Generality”, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1179, 1196 (2010). 
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make to a speedy and satisfactory decision on the merits.”74 To decide 
cases on the merits requires deciding what to decide: i.e., what is the 
applicable law and which facts are material and in dispute. Then can 
facts be found and law applied.75 Deciding cases on the merits means 
making decisions according to law. 
1.   Pleading: The Old Way of Deciding What to Decide 
To facilitate deciding cases on the merits, the Federal Rules had to 
overcome failures of two prior eras of American civil procedure, i.e., 
common law pleading and code pleading, in deciding what to decide. 
Common law pleading as designed, and code pleading as applied, 
failed because they forced parties to an issue, in the case of the former, 
or to multiple issues, in the case of the latter, too soon.76 At the same 
time, for certain classes of cases, there existed a parallel system of 
“equity” pleading. It failed because it never got to issue.77 
Common law and code pleading expected that parties by themselves 
would come to an issue.78 Through pleading, parties chose the law to 
be applied.79 At trial, parties proved facts that would, in theory, decide 
rights based on the law agreed and thus would resolve their disputes 
according to law. In common law pleading, parties were to make a 
single issue, whether of law, or of fact, determinative. 80  In code 
pleading, parties had more leeway: they could raise multiple issues of 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Trying Issues, 5 TEX. L. REV. 18, 20 (1926) [hereinafter 
Sunderland, Trying Issues]; accord Edson R. Sunderland, The Machinery of Procedural Reform, 22 MICH. 
L. REV. 293, 296 (1924) [hereinafter Sunderland, Machinery]; cf. Paul D. Carrington, Ceremony and 
Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A. J. 860, 860 (1980) (“[J]udges not only make law, 
they also decide cases—real cases . . . in conformity with law . . . .”). 
 75. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 2 (2d ed. 1947) (“Before any 
dispute can be adjusted or decided it is necessary to ascertain the actual points at issue between the 
disputants.”); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 1 
(1st American ed., 1824, last American ed. 1919, 1867) (“In the course of administering justice between 
litigating parties, there are two successive objects—to ascertain the subjects for decision, and to decide.”); 
Maxeiner, supra note 3, at 1265 n.26 (“‘The issues of fact and of law must be framed clearly enough so 
that the tribunal knows what to decide.’”) (quoting FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C, HAZARD, JR. & 
JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 180 (5th ed. 2001)). 
 76. See Julian, supra note 73, at 1184, 1186. 
 77. CLARK, supra note 75, at 16–17. 
 78. Julian, supra note 73, at 1184, 1186. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1184. 
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law or fact. But they were to raise all issues in pleading.81 Clark and 
Sunderland saw that was too soon. 
Clark and Sunderland were pleading’s critics par excellence. 
Pleadings, Clark wrote, “are only a mere step in trying to get to the 
actual merits of the litigation.”82 They serve, Sunderland explained, 
“only as preliminary forecasts of the real issues.”83 It is a truism of 
lawsuits that no one can predict with certainty what the process will 
turn up in the way of facts and legal issues. An issue that may not have 
been apparent at the outset can become central to decision. 
Civil procedure aims at correct application of law to facts. The 
process starts out with imperfect knowledge of which rules are 
applicable and of which alleged facts are true. Applying law to facts 
requires determining rules that are applicable to facts and finding facts 
that are material to applicable rules. 
Determining which rules are applicable and finding which facts are 
material are interdependent inquiries: Until one knows which rules 
apply, one cannot know which facts are material. Until one knows the 
facts, one cannot know which rules apply. Settle the applicable rules 
too soon, and facts may be overlooked that would change the result if 
other rules applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules soon enough, and 
the process may detour to find facts that are not material under the 
rules actually applied and may not even be disputed. “The process of 
applying law to facts is thus one which requires going back and forth 
from law to facts and facts to law.”84 
Sunderland identified this back-and-forth process: 
[T]he process of developing issues is one which proceeds in 
stages,—first and most vaguely in the written pleadings; secondly, 
and much more explicitly, in the opening statements of counsel, 
and finally and conclusively in the production of the evidence. By 
the time the case is ready for the decision of the court or the jury, 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See id. at 1186. 
 82. Clark, supra note 73, at 312. 
 83. Sunderland, Trying Issues, supra note 74, at 18. 
 84. MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 52, at 90–91. 
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the [r]eal points in dispute are fully revealed.85 
In the end, common law pleading and code pleading shared the same 
malady: apply pleading requirements strictly, and decisions are made 
unjustly without the benefit of all the facts; apply pleading 
requirements too loosely, and trials go off track or parties are 
“ambushed” by facts and law not previously disclosed that they are not 
prepared to meet.86 
2.   Pre-trial: The New Way of Deciding What to Decide 
In the Federal Rules of 1938, Clark and Sunderland introduced 
measures meant to minimize the sporting elements of procedure and to 
promote deciding cases on their merits.87 No longer would the parties 
alone choose the law and designate the material facts; the court would 
help them identify the legal and factual issues. No longer would the 
parties identify at the outset the precise facts that they would prove. 
They would present facts, and courts would decide parties’ rights 
under law and justice. Through pleading and pretrial discovery, the 
parties and the court would formulate the issues. Through summary 
judgment, trial, jury instructions, and justified judgments (special 
verdicts, findings of fact, and conclusions of law), courts would apply 
law and validate their applications of law to fact.88 
The Federal Rules are most controversially known for relaxing 
pleading and for creating discovery. 89  These measures avoid 
premature determination of law and facts, but also were to promote 
expeditious handling of cases by eliminating false issues.90 They were 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Sunderland, Trying Issues, supra note 74, at 18. 
 86. Edson R. Sunderland, The Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in the New Illinois Civil Practice 
Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 188, 200 (1933). 
 87. ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS 6–7 (1940); Sunderland, 
supra note 86, at 200 (stating that a trial should be “a well-organized presentation of the merits of the case 
instead of a contest in which each party attempts to overwhelm his opponent by unexpected attacks from 
ambush”). 
 88. See MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 52, at 200–06. 
 89. See, e.g., HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 6–7. 
 90. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 67, at 716–17. 
15
Maxeiner: The Federal Rules at 75: Dispute Resolution, Private Enforcement
Published by Reading Room, 2014
998 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
to see to it that, unencumbered by fictions and technicalities, parties 
provided courts with facts. 
The Federal Rules are less well-known, and are less favorably 
known among professionals, for their measures for applying law and 
validating decisions, e.g., summary judgments, jury instructions, 
special verdicts, directed verdicts and court findings of fact, and 
conclusions of law. Just as relaxed pleading and discovery were to 
assure all the facts came out, these measures were to assure that issues 
were framed, trials were conducted expeditiously and efficiently, and 
decisions were reached on the merits.91  These were to assure that 
courts correctly gave parties their rights. 
The enigma of the Federal Rules was, and is, who shall formulate 
the issues? In common law and code pleading, lawyers did. The 
Federal Rules of 1938 offered a change: they authorized, but did not 
require, courts to formulate issues. That has proved to be a fatal flaw. 
So what were these tools?92 
a.   Finding and Presenting Material Facts in Dispute 
The Federal Rules created a new system of presenting facts. The 
Rules were to be “‘avenues to justice and not dead-end streets without 
direction or purpose.’” 93  Under the new system, parties were not 
required to establish in their pleadings the precise legal ground of their 
claims. Rule 7, in allowing for only one form of pleading for all cases, 
eliminated the common law requirement that parties had to choose a 
form of action and therefore legal ground for recovery.94 Rule 8, by 
requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” 95  made it impossible to oblige 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Maxeiner, Pleading, supra note 3, at 1278–79. 
 92. To avoid confusion with the Rules as amended, the Rules as adopted in 1938 are spoken of in the 
past tense, even though often the same language is found in the current Rules. There are a number of 
editions of the Rules as adopted in 1938. Here, this article addresses the 1939 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States. FED. R. CIV. P. (1939). 
 93. HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 14–15 (quoting Laverett v. Cont’l Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 81 
(E.D.N.Y. 1938)). 
 94. FED. R. CIV. P. 7; Julian, supra note 73, at 1184–86. 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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plaintiffs to present precise outlines of facts they would prove to 
establish their rights.96 
The new system directed parties toward applying law to facts and 
away from immaterial matters. So Rule 8(d) provided that failure to 
deny an averment in a pleading requiring a response (e.g., a complaint) 
has the effect of an admission.97 This was to focus parties on disputed 
points of material fact and expedite decisions.98 Rule 8(e)(1) provided 
that averments “shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical 
forms of pleading or motions are required.” 99  It thus reinforced 
elimination of the forms of action and abolition of legal fictions that 
had accompanied them, and worked to produce decisions on the 
merits. 
Rule 8(e)(2) allowed parties to state claims alternatively,100 thus 
allowing them to account for the possibility that facts proven might fit 
different legal claims.101 Rule 8(f) provided that all pleadings were to 
be construed so “as to do substantial justice.”102 Rule 9 relieved parties 
of pleading and proving matters that normally might be assumed to be 
true (e.g., (a) capacity of parties, (d) genuineness of official 
documents, and (e) validity of judgments) and assigned these as 
matters for opposing parties to challenge. 103  At the same time, 
however, it required that certain matters, i.e., fraud or mistake, be 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Clark did not use the term “notice pleading” in the Federal Rules and did not regard Rule 8’s 
requirement as a mere notice, but as a “more legal requirement.” Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 
27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 278 (1942); accord HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 25 (“It suffices to plead 
conclusions, whether of fact or of law, provided the complaint is sufficiently definite so as to give fair 
notice to the opposite party of the precise nature of the claim.”). 
 97. HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 26–27 (setting out Rule 8(d) as adopted in 1938); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (for the modern version of the Rule). 
 98. But see HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 32 (“A statement that the defendant is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of certain allegations in the complaint has the effect 
of a denial. This is the case even if the facts are presumably within the pleader’s knowledge.”). 
 99. See id. at 27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). 
 100. HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 27 (for the Rule as enacted in 1938); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2) 
(for the modern version of the Rule). 
 101. HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 25 (“In view of the fact that the pleader will be awarded that relief to 
which he is entitled, a pleading may not be dismissed on the ground that a party has misconceived his 
remedy and his prayer for judgment is not well founded, provided he is entitled to some relief on the facts 
averred.”). “Inconsistent claims may be joined in the same pleading . . . . The pleader is not required to 
elect as between such claims.” Id. at 26. 
 102. Id. at 27. 
 103. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(a), (d), (e); see also HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 27–30. 
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stated with “particularity” and that special damages (e.g., 
consequential damages or punitive damages), be stated 
“specifically.”104 Rule 9 thus promoted moving the conflict to material 
matters likely to be in dispute. 
Rule 11 followed the precedent of code pleading, which used a 
requirement of signing pleadings as a way to prevent attorneys from 
making fictitious claims. 105  It thus authorized judges to strike 
pleadings that were without good ground or were interposed for delay 
and permitted them to sanction attorneys for willful violations.106 Rule 
11 would move parties on to matters material and in dispute. Rules 13 
and 14 swept away old cramped counterclaim and third-party practice 
and invited consideration of all issues among all parties.107 
b.   Formulating Issues 
The new system sought to suppress the sporting theory of justice 
and direct proceedings to issues material under substantive law and in 
dispute.108 Rule 12(b) consolidated for early court decision dilatory 
objections directed to procedural prerequisites, i.e., subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, process, service of process, 
and sufficiency of the complaint.109 Rule 12(h) required that most of 
these objections be made immediately or be forever waived. 110 
Dispatching these expeditiously from the proceedings permitted the 
process to move on to decisions on the merits. Rules 12(c) and 12(d) 
permitted courts to decide cases on the pleadings, where the merits 
were already clear or failing procedural prerequisites fatal.111 Rules 
12(e) and 12(f) bestowed on courts authority to begin applying law to 
facts by striking pleadings, defenses, and redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter.112 To decide cases required party 
                                                                                                                 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), (g); see also HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 29–30. 
 105. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b); see also HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 31. 
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (c); see also HOLTZOFF, supra note 87, at 32. 
 107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14. 
 108. See Bone, supra note 2, at 290 & n.14. 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
 110. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c), (d). 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e), (f). 
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motion; the court could strike pleadings on its own without party 
motion.113 
Rule 15 underscored the tentative nature of pleadings as a 
preliminary step in getting at the material issues between the parties 
and in dispute.114 Even at trial, should a party object that evidence 
presented was outside the pleadings, Rule 15(b) directed the court to 
freely allow amendment “when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby.”115 It authorized the court to grant a 
continuance to enable the other party to meet the evidence.116 
Rule 16, then titled “Pre-Trial Procedure: Formulating Issues[,]” 
was the key to making the new system of applying law work.117 Where 
common law pleading and code pleading looked to the parties to settle 
the issues between them, Rule 16 enabled judges to take an active 
hand.118 
In the new system, the parties were to use discovery to formulate 
issues for trial. So George Ragland, who provided the systematic 
foundation for discovery, wrote: 
[Pleading and discovery] effect a division of labor toward a 
common end, namely, the formulation of the dispute into a 
justiciable form by disclosing the material controverted facts and 
eliminating the uncontroverted and unessential facts in each case 
prior to its final presentation for decision. Discovery procedure 
and pleading approach the problem from the same basic 
standpoint: both are equally in harmony with the traditional 
Anglo-American doctrine of party-formulation of issues.119 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
 114. FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b) (1938). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Harry D. Nims, The Cost of Justice: A New Approach, 39 A.B.A. J. 455, 458, 522–23 (1953). 
 118. Id. 
 119. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 260 (1932). 
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c.   Applying Law to Facts 
To facilitate getting process to decide real issues between parties, as 
well as to expedite process, Rule 56 introduced the nearly new device 
of summary judgment. 120  Rule 56(c) required courts to render 
judgment “forthwith” if all materials on file and submitted showed that 
there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”121 
The Rules, as adopted, aimed at trying cases according to 
substantive law and justice. They included many provisions intended 
to promote rational determination of law, finding of fact, and applying 
law to facts. The Rules expected judges to work to help jurors decide 
according to law. Rule 51 governed judges giving jurors instructions 
in how to decide.122 Rule 49 encouraged judges to require juries to 
explain their verdicts through special verdicts and answers to 
interrogatories.123 Rule 48(c) permitted judges to poll jurors to assure 
their adherence to their verdict.124 Rule 50 gave judges substantial 
authority to decide issues or cases as a matter of law, both before and 
after jury deliberation.125 Rule 52 required that judges justify their 
decisions in those cases where juries were not used. 126  Rule 38 
provided that juries would be deemed waived if not requested at the 
outset of proceedings.127 Perhaps because trials have fallen into disuse, 
these measures are only occasionally thought of today. 
C.   The Federal Rules Come of Age Lagging Justice (1959) 
The Federal Rules came into force September 16, 1938.128 Theirs 
was the misfortune that less than a year later, Europe went to war. As 
a result, the Rules had a stunted childhood. When they turned twenty-
                                                                                                                 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (1938). 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 49. 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(c). 
 125. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 126. FED. R. CIV. P. 52. 
 127. FED. R. CIV. P. 38. 
 128. Current Rules of Practice & Procedure, U. S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/ 
rules/current-rules.aspx (last visited June 21, 2014). 
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one, one of their supporters, Judge Alfred P. Murrah, lamented that 
“wartime controls and limitations on travel brought a decrease in 
litigation and there was little opportunity for the new procedures to 
become firmly rooted.”129 The end of the war did not improve things. 
“In their struggle to keep pace with [the great tide of postwar 
litigation], many courts either lacked the time or the interest to delve 
into what new procedural techniques might be helpful.”130 Events, the 
judge concluded, “had suppressed development of widespread 
knowledge of the Federal Rules and of the use of the pre-trial 
conference.”131 
In their teenage years, the Federal Rules suffered from a judgment 
common to the gifted young: “not performing up to ability.” Already 
in 1949, addressing civil justice generally, “realist” Judge Jerome 
Frank let loose his polemic, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in 
American Justice.132 Report cards finding problems with Rules started 
to appear soon thereafter. Judge Prettyman in 1951 directed his to 
“non-routine cases.”133 In 1953, Benjamin Kaplan, later first Reporter 
of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, thought the conclusion 
unremarkable that “legal procedure still falls far short of reasonable 
and reasonably attainable goals.”134  By the mid-1950s, bad report 
cards were common. “Teachers” called conferences to discuss the 
shortcomings of civil justice. When the Rules were still but seventeen, 
in 1956, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. convened the first 
Attorney General’s Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in 
Litigation.135 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Alfred P. Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 70, 73 (1960). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). 
 133. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE REPORT ON PROCEDURE IN ANTI-
TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES, 13 F.R.D. 62, 62–63, in Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in 
Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62–84 (1953); see also Dennis A. Kendig, Procedures for Management of 
Non-Routine Cases, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701, 701–02 (1975). 
 134. Benjamin Kaplan & Livingston Hall, Foreword, 287 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. vii, 
vii (1953). 
 135. Conference on Court Congestion and Delay Executive Committee, J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC. 91, 
91 (1956). 
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The year that the Federal Rules turned twenty, 1958, it might have 
seemed that just about everybody was dumping on the civil justice 
system, if not always on the Rules themselves. In February of 1958, 
Warren E. Burger, then recently appointed District of Columbia 
Circuit Judge, who later as Chief Justice would be the Rules’ supreme 
critic, addressed a regional ABA meeting in a talk with a title 
reminiscent of Judge Frank’s polemic, “The Courts on Trial: a Call for 
Action Against Delay.”136 Chief Justice Warren followed up with a 
one-two punch of addresses in May at the annual meeting of the 
American Law Institute (ALI) and in August at the annual meeting of 
the ABA.137 At the latter, the nation’s Chief Justice told the group: 
“[I]nterminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today 
compromising the basic legal rights of countless thousands of 
Americans and, imperceptibly, corroding the very foundations of 
constitutional government in the United States.”138 If that was not stern 
enough correction, interspersed between the two Chief Justice’s 
critiques at the ALI and ABA meetings, Attorney General Brownell’s 
successor, Attorney General William P. Rogers, held the second 
Attorney General’s Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in 
Civil Litigation.139 The ABA, as it had to Pound’s Address at the 1906 
Annual Meeting, responded to Chief Justice Warren’s admonitions by 
establishing a special committee (on court congestion), which even 
published its own monthly newsletter, Court Congestion.140 
When the Federal Rules turned twenty-one, the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science delivered a rhetorical kick in the pants: 
a symposium titled Lagging Justice.141 The symposium analyzed the 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Warren E. Burger, The Courts on Trial: A Call for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.A. J. 738, 738 
(1958). 
 137. Earl Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.A. J. 1043, 1043 
(1958). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Henry P. Chandler, The Problem of Congestion and Delay in the Federal Courts, 328 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 144, 152 (1960). 
 140. Milton D. Green, The Situation in 1959, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7, 8 (1960). 
 141. See Glenn R. Winters, Foreword, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. vii, vii–viii (1960); 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Literature of Judicial Administration: Books, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 210, 
210–11 (1960). 
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long time it took to get to trial after pleadings were closed. 142 
Participants identified the causes of lagging justice, less in the Rules 
themselves, and more in management, personnel, and, above all, in 
growth in the number of proceedings without adequate additional 
judicial manpower.143 Pretrial discovery was not mentioned as a cause 
of delay, but failure to make full use of the pretrial conference of Rule 
16 was.144 Drafter, then Judge, Clark was invited to speak up for his 
offspring and did: Clark claimed that criticism was “overdrawn.”145 
The symposium title “Lagging Justice,” he said, was “not apt.”146 
Certainly his Rules had not led to problems: “the general success of 
the rules has been phenomenal. This is shown not only . . . by the 
uniform chorus of praise, but also by their adoption in the states.”147 
The Symposium did not consider revision of the Rules or an overhaul 
of civil justice.148 
In defending the Rules, Clark held firm to the idea that they worked 
to decide cases on the merits by facilitating the framing of issues. His 
new pleading was not some form of notice pleading; it addressed the 
“very practical need . . . of uncovering the matters really in dispute 
well in advance of the formal and portentous full-dress trial.”149 The 
various pretrial procedures—discovery, summary judgment, and 
pretrial conferences—were working towards “uncovering the merits at 
an early stage.”150 The pre-trial conference was at hand “to settle the 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Kalven, supra note 141, at 210. 
 143. See generally Roger A. Johnsen, Judicial Manpower Problems, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 29 (1960) (exploring various ways to more effectively use the undermanned American 
judiciary). 
 144. See Murrah, supra note 129, at 70. 
 145. Charles E. Clark, Practice and Procedure, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 61, 61 (1960) 
[hereinafter Clark, Practice and Procedure]. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 66. 
 148. In 1959, Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz published the first edition of their 
famous study. See HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN, JR. & BERNARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE REMEDIES FOR DELAYED JUSTICE (1959). In the Lagging Justice Symposium, they 
presented the study’s results as calling for the most modest of change. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Bar, The 
Court, and The Delay, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 44–45 (1960); Hans Zeisel, The 
Jury and the Court Delay, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 46, 52 (1960). Yet years later, 
Professor Carrington termed their study “a monstrous empirical assault on the institution of the civil jury.” 
Carrington, In Memoriam, supra note 49, at 1902. 
 149. Clark, Practice and Procedure, supra note 145, at 62. 
 150. Id. at 65. 
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issues and admissions of things not questioned and generally to 
advance the case for trial only on essentials.”151 Clark provided the 
tools, but his optimistic views of how they would be used were not 
borne out by experiences. 
D.   At Middle Age: Popular Dissatisfaction (Again) (1976) 
By the 1970s, it was clear that American civil justice was in trouble. 
Already in 1971 Maurice Rosenberg, himself a hero of civil procedure, 
pronounced American civil justice “failing” and lamented that 
“‘Crisis’ is the word most commonly used to describe the status of our 
judicial system.”152 Chief Justice Burger tried to cure the maladies. He 
called a conference for 1976 to address them. 
1.   The National Conference on the Causes of the Popular 
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice (“The Pound 
Conference”) (1976) 
In April 1976, just months shy of the 70th anniversary of Pound’s 
famous address in St. Paul, the chief justices of the supreme courts of 
the American states under the leadership of Warren E. Burger, Chief 
Justice of the United States, gathered for a conference that took its 
name from Pound’s own address: “The National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice.”153 The Chief Justice asked his state counterparts: “[H]ow can 
we serve the interests of justice with processes more speedy and less 
expensive?” 154 
The 1976 Pound Conference in St. Paul was Pound’s 1906 address 
redux—right down to the very venue in the Chamber of the Minnesota 
House. Except, where Pound had been a doctor diagnosing disease, the 
Chief Justice was less a doctor prescribing cure than a pathologist 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. 
 152. Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That are Civil to Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 
MICH. L. REV. 797, 798 (1971). 
 153. Warren E. Burger, Preface to THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE 
FUTURE 5, 6 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
 154. Id. 
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conducting a post-mortem. 155  Seventy years of law reform had 
spawned new law reform organizations such as the American 
Judicature Society, the American Law Institute, and the Federal 
Judicial Center, but, had not secured the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
2.   What Went Wrong? 
Clark and Sunderland overestimated the likelihood of the bench and 
bar moving out of historic character.156 The Federal Rules were to 
promote cooperation between bench and bar. Judges were to help bring 
adversary lawyers to issues, which courts would then try.157 Instead, 
however, judges were reluctant to interfere with adversaries’ control 
of process.158 Lawyers declined to define material issues in dispute.159 
Where Sunderland saw discovery as a way to eliminate undisputed 
issues, lawyers used the rules to discover new disputes. They used easy 
pleading and discovery to further their clients’ interests “by all means 
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons.”160 
Notice pleading was fine and discovery was even better. Why settle 
for an unpredictable jury result when one could use discovery to drive 
the opponent into the ground? 
From lawyers’ perspective the Federal Rules gave them tools for 
mining gold. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, particularly those paid on contingent 
fees, could use discovery to create uncertainty on claims and recovery 
and thereby garner bigger recoveries and larger fees.161 Defendants’ 
lawyers, working by the hour, could make money looking under every 
stone for evidence and taking every precaution to meet every 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See id. 
 156. Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1516, 1518–19 (1998). 
 157. Id. at 1519. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. The quote is from Lord Brougham’s famous description of adversary representation. Monroe H. 
Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319, 1323 (2006). 
 161. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 67, at 741. 
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conceivable attack.162 It is no coincidence that hourly billing became 
the norm when discovery became routine.163 
Cases were not decided by who was right, but by who played the 
game better. The Federal Rules were used not to decide what to 
decide—the long elusive common law goal—but to broaden what to 
decide. The consequence was predictable: cases were never decided. 
They were settled.164 
Even had the Federal Rules been used as intended, it seems unlikely 
that they would have been fully successful in demolishing sporting 
justice and substituting decisions according to law. They were 
procedural reform without court reform or law reform.165 They did not 
address indemnity for attorneys’ fees, jurisdiction, or appellate review. 
All three of these contribute to contentious litigation in America. The 
Federal Rules did not reorganize courts or judicial selection. They 
were not accompanied by systematization of substantive law. 
As a result, the Federal Rules did not end gamesmanship: rather they 
changed the game from swift checkers to slow chess.166 Worse, they 
turned contests into wars of attrition.167 
E.   The Fourth Era in Civil Procedure 
The newest chronicles of the Federal Rules say that today we are in 
a new, fourth era in civil procedure.168 The first was common law 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. 
 163. George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94–95 (1999) (using an economic model to support the premise that liberal discovery 
rules under the Federal Rules were a “substantial factor” in encouraging the legal profession to move to 
hourly billing). 
 164. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 67, at 706–07. 
 165. Roscoe Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN BAG 438, 439 (1910) (“It 
is not too much, indeed, to say that improvement in these three particulars [court organization, bench, and 
bar] is a necessary precursor of thoroughgoing reform of procedure.”). 
 166. Compare William D. Mitchell, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
423, 430 (1936) (“[A] suit is not a mere game of checkers . . . .”), with William S. Bailey, Successful 
Pretrial Motions in 10 Moves, TRIAL, Mar. 2009, at 22 (examining pretrial motions as chess moves). 
 167. See, e.g., FREDERICK L. WHITMER, LITIGATION IS WAR: STRATEGY & TACTICS FOR THE 
LITIGATION BATTLEFIELD 1 (2007); Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts, 70 F.R.D. 
79, 107 (1976) (“The practice—in many areas of the law—has been to make discovery the ‘sporting 
match’ and an endurance contest.”). 
 168. SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING THE FEDERAL 
COURTHOUSE DOORS? 75–78 (2013); Stephen Subrin & Thomas Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
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pleading.169 The second was code pleading under Field’s 1848 code.170 
The third was under the original Federal Rules of 1938.171 And now, 
the fourth era is that of the Federal Rules as reformulated since the 
Pound Conference.172 Since then, responding to dissatisfaction with 
the administration of justice, through Rules amendment and extra-
rules court precedent, procedures have moved and continue to move to 
limit discovery, hasten dispute resolution, and turn judges into “case 
managers.” 173  In this fourth era, the Federal Rules are to control 
parties’ access to courts (“plausibility pleading”), limit private 
investigations (numerical limits on depositions and interrogatories), 
restrict parties’ access to trials (increased use of summary judgments) 
and leave more cases to judges and fewer to juries (more directed 
verdicts, special verdicts, and judgments notwithstanding verdicts).174 
The changes focus on controlling private invocation of litigation and 
its tools of discovery. They show little concern for deciding cases 
according to law.175 
Defenders of the Federal Rules of the third era, the proponents of 
private enforcement, challenge the changes that create the fourth. They 
argue that the changes work against access to courts and, in the end, 
justice.176 They claim that critics exaggerate expenses; they say most 
are proportionate.177 Yet, when most litigating lawyers acknowledge 
cases with amounts in dispute under $100,000 are not viable, it is hard 
for defenders of the third era to seriously assert that the Federal Rules 
achieve their mission of securing the just, inexpensive, and expeditious 
resolution of every case. Indeed, already thirty years ago Professor 
                                                                                                                 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 169. Arthur. R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288–90 (2013) [hereinafter 
Miller, Simplified Pleading]; Julian, supra note 73, at 1184–85. 
 170. Julian, supra note 73, at 1186–87; Clark, Practice and Procedure, supra note 145, at 61. 
 171. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 172. DODSON, supra note 168, at 30–46. 
 173. See id. at 77. 
 174. Id. at 75–81; Miller, Federal Courthouse Doors, supra note 37, at 59194, 597; Craig B. Shaffer & 
Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past the Debate: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178, 17879, 197 (2013). 
 175. DODSON, supra note 168, at 77. 
 176. Miller, Federal Courthouse Doors, supra note 37, at 591–94, 597. 
 177. See id. at 598. 
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Miller himself wondered whether “the adversary system as we know 
it has become too costly and inefficient a device for resolving civil 
disputes.”178 
Defenders have designed a different defense. It is an epic story of 
how the Federal Rules have taken on an alternative social role of 
private enforcement of public law. 
III.   FEDERAL RULES—THE EPIC 
The aim of the movement served by these heroes has been to make 
judicial institutions more effective and more efficient in 
performing their assigned mission. In America, that mission has 
been not merely to resolve disputes, but also to give substance to 
the Constitution by enforcing the rights of citizens. 
Paul D. Carrington (1995)179 
 
Today, when American proceduralists celebrate, they fete the heroic 
years: the 1960s and the early 1970s. Those were years of civil rights 
lawmaking, of mass tort litigation, and of private enforcement of 
public norms.180 It was an era when one could believe in “using the 
civil litigation system to deliver the promise of the law to those who 
were otherwise without much power in society.” 181  Proceduralists 
lament later Supreme Court decisions that have turned those dynamic 
bright summer days of hope into desultory dark winter days of 
discontent. They ask, are the courthouse doors closing?182 
Proceduralists tell an epic story of good versus evil that continues to 
this day. “[T]hose who oppose civil justice[,]” former reporter 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984). 
 179. Carrington, In Memoriam, supra note 49, at 1901 (“Its father could be said to be Jeremy Bentham. 
Its seldom-sung American heroes include David Dudley Field, Roscoe Pound, Harry Wigmore, Charles 
Clark, and Maurice Rosenberg.”). 
 180. D. Michael Risinger, Wolves and Sheep, Predators and Scavengers, or Why I Left Civil Procedure 
(Not With a Bang, but a Whimper), 60 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1622–23 (2013). 
 181. Id. See generally James Gordley, The Meaning of Equal Access to Legal Services, 10 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 220 (1977). 
 182. DODSON, supra note 168; Miller, Federal Courthouse Doors, supra note 37, at 587; Weinstein, 
supra note 6, at 1907 (speaking of an “anti-access movement”). 
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Professor Paul D. Carrington writes, “are numerous, ubiquitous, and 
persistent . . . . Every victory for the cause is therefore temporary, even 
evanescent, because each is predestined to evoke a response by the 
devils within us all. The forces of darkness return.”183 
Who can better tell that epic with more credibility and eloquence 
than Professor Carrington and his compatriots Professors Arthur R. 
Miller and Richard L. Marcus: three of only four living present and 
former reporters for the Advisory Committee of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure?184 Their good will, decency, idealism, and ideals inspire us 
to achieve justice for all. They are the synoptic writers of the epic that 
is the Federal Rules: Miller, Marcus, and Paul Carrington.185 Their 
epic is informed by important historical work of proceduralists of the 
last quarter century. 
A.   Founders’ Era (1938–1959) 
The epic begins a long time ago, a time out of mind, a time that none 
of us remembers: 1938. It was a time of great depression. Civil justice 
was debased by “debilitating technicalities and rigidity that 
characterized the prior English and American procedural systems—
that is, the common law forms of action and then the codes.” 186 
Disputes were resolved in sporting contests by “tricks or traps or 
obfuscation.”187 
A new world dawned September 16, 1938 when the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure took effect. 188  It was the “Golden Age of 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Carrington, In Memoriam, supra note 49, at 1901. 
 184. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, APRIL 10–11, 2014 MEETING 7 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2014-04.pdf 
(listing Richard L. Marcus and Edward H. Cooper as current reporters); Federal Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure Opens “Duke Rules Package” for Comment, DUKE LAW SCH., (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://law.duke.edu/news/federal-committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-opens-duke-rules-package-
comment/ (describing Arthur R. Miller and Paul D. Carrington as former reporters). 
 185. The fourth, Edward H. Cooper, so far as I know, does not disagree with the synoptic epic Miller, 
Marcus, and Carrington; but he has not told his views in publications known to the author. 
 186. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 288–89. 
 187. Id. at 288; Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionsim in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 929, 932 (1996) (“[N]ineteenth century civil procedure was a sport of chance in which the substantive 
merits of claims and defenses played a minor role.”). 
 188. Lately Professor Marcus has doubted whether it was quite so new. See Richard Marcus, Bomb 
Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic Values—A New Path to Procedural Harmonization?, 107 NW. 
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Rulemaking” when “giants trod the soil of rulemaking. Drawing from 
the legacy of Jeremy Bentham, David Dudley Field, and Roscoe 
Pound, a small band of drafters created the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the late 1930s and changed the American procedural 
landscape.” 189  These giants, “the distinguished proceduralists who 
drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the courts and 
in the resolution of disputes on their merits.”190 They could do that. 
1938 was a simpler time. It was easier to resolve cases on their merits. 
Litigation was about “relatively simple matters.”191 
The epic writers gloss over what Chief Justices Warren and then 
Judge, later Chief Justice, Burger saw already in 1958: the civil justice 
system was failing to meet the demands increased litigation was 
placing on it.192 Instead, they prefer to remember from the first two 
decades of the Federal Rules how the Supreme Court supercharged the 
rules governing pleading and discovery. In Conley v. Gibson, the Court 
found almost any allegation might satisfy Rule 8’s requirements for a 
complaint.193 In Hickman v. Taylor, it approved use of discovery “to 
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues.”194 
B.   Rights Revolution (the 1960s) 
How things have changed since 1959! “Today’s worlds of civil 
rights, employment discrimination, environmental, consumer 
protection, pension, high-tech, and product safety litigation largely did 
not exist when the Federal Rules were formulated . . . . [T]here were 
not even law school courses on those subjects in the 1950s.”195 In the 
1960s, there were notable increases in employment discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
U. L. REV. 475, 481 (2013). 
 189. Marcus, Modes, supra note 18, at 157; accord Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure 
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 604 (2010) [hereinafter Carrington, Politics] 
(noting the “eminent lawyers” who were not quite giants). 
 190. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 288; accord Carrington, supra note 189, at 604. 
 191. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 290. 
 192. Id. at 360–61. 
 193. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957). 
 194. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
 195. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 292. 
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cases,
 
and in assertions of new rights by consumers, and by those 
seeking to enforce complex environmental laws.196 
“[L]awyers, fully armed in 1938 with thetools of discovery, could 
effectively uncover falsehood and wrongdoing in civil cases.”197 This 
was fortuitous drafting by the giants, for private enforcement had not 
been a guiding goal of their work in 1938. “In retrospect, it seems that 
the private enforcement orientation grew somewhat organically over 
the twentieth century.”198  It was a new development in American 
history that emerged largely only after World War II. 
By the time the rights revolution rolled around, the Federal Rules as 
interpreted enabled parties to “conduct private investigations of 
business practices threatening harm to consumers, passengers, tenants, 
workers, patients, or franchisees.”199 1970 saw, by Rules amendment, 
abolition of the Rule 34(a) requirement that parties needed good cause 
and a judicial order to obtain discovery of documents.200  By then 
judges could “make law and policy to an extent not regarded as 
permissible in most other nations.”201 
C.   Corporate Counterrevolution 
Not everyone appreciated the super-charged Federal Rules. Against 
the private enforcement of public policies came, according to the epic, 
“a backlash that favors corporate and governmental interests against 
the claims of individual citizens.”202 The backlash has been hydra-
headed—taking many forms—all promoted by a corporate interest-
captured Supreme Court: rule reformations, new applications of 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Carrington, Politics, supra note 189, at 601–02. 
 197. Paul D. Carrington, Moths to the Light: The Dubious Attractions of American Law, 46 U. KAN. L. 
REV 673, 684 (1998) [hereinafter Carrington, Moths to the Light]; Carrington, Politics, supra note 189, at 
605 (“To the extent that the Progressive reformers achieved their aims, private citizens gained the ability 
to enforce many diverse laws enacted or proclaimed to protect public interests as well as their own.”). 
 198. Marcus, American Exceptionalism, supra note 20, at 139. 
 199. Carrington, supra note 189, at 610. 
 200. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE DISCOVERY RULES app. B (1969), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Reports/CV07-1969.pdf. 
 201. Paul D. Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1413, 
1419 (2004) [hereinafter Carrington, American]. 
 202. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 302. 
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previously little used rules, “retiring” of precedents that had super-
charged rules for private enforcement, and new legislation through 
“interpretation.”203 
The epic writers tell how changes in the Federal Rules, both by 
amendment and by interpretation, threaten the private enforcement 
goal. “Not surprisingly,” Professor Marcus writes, “those who 
challenge the private enforcement goal in the U.S. also seem to want 
to dismantle the procedural apparatus that supports it.”204 Professor 
Miller writes of eight steps in “deformation” of procedure in federal 
courts: (a) reformulation of pretrial conferences; (b) summary 
judgment; (c) expert evidence; (d) class actions; (e) the Federal 
Arbitration Act; (f) pleading requirements; (g) personal jurisdiction; 
and (h) discovery.205 Professor Carrington says that the Supreme Court 
“has evidenced a probusiness shift . . . to weaken private enforcement 
of public laws regulating business.”206 It has put its thumb on the scale 
in favor of business. The aspiration of “equal justice under law” has 
been supplanted, says Professor Miller, by intentions “to impede 
meaningful citizen access to our justice system or to impair the 
enforcement of our public policies and constitutional principles by 
constructing a procedural Great Wall of China or Maginot Line around 
the courtrooms in our courthouses.”207 
But the epic has not won over the public or the profession. Dispute 
resolution leads. 
IV.   THE FUTURE ON THE MERITS? 
It is sometimes assumed that the business of courts is merely 
dispute resolution, by whatever means may be effective to bring 
repose . . . . I assume that this pre-Enlightenment purpose will not 
become the norm, and that we will continue to expect courts to 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See id. at 302–06, 309. 
 204. Marcus, American Exceptionalism, supra note 20, at 139. 
 205. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 287. 
 206. Carrington, Politics, supra note 189, at 609. 
 207. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 372. 
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decide cases by applying law to fact. 
Paul D. Carrington (1998)208 
 
Professor Carrington has it right: courts exist to decide cases by 
applying law to facts. He quips: Mr. Legality points the way to the 
“Celestial City.”209 That’s smart, but no surprise. The essential goal of 
every modern system of civil justice is the application of law to facts 
to determine rights and resolve disputes according to law and 
justice.210 In this way, legal systems not only do right in individual 
cases, they make social life possible. They validate a nation’s laws and 
facilitate its peoples’ compliance with law. 
A.   Learning From Foreign Systems 
The Federal Rules fail because they do not apply law to fact. That 
is unfortunate, but it is no good reason to give up on the essential goal 
of civil justice systems. Other systems show it to be an attainable goal. 
Learn from others! There’s nothing new in that. It is a mantra of our 
federal system, that every state is a laboratory for other states.211 OK. 
Let’s do it. There’s no good reason to look at the work of only 
American laboratories. Sunderland himself called for us to see in civil 
law systems “the most valuable data upon which to base our own 
experiments in procedural reform.”212 
One system that we might learn well from is the German. It is among 
the finest and most admired in the world.213 The German system takes 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Carrington, supra note 156, at 1522–23. 
 209. See id. at 1517. 
 210. Uzelac, supra note 1, at 3 (“It would be easy to state the obvious and repeat that in all justice 
systems of the world the role of civil justice is to apply the applicable substantive law to the established 
facts in an impartial manner, and pronounce fair and accurate judgments.”). This collection includes 
twelve papers on the goals of civil justice in an approximately like number of countries. The paper from 
the United States is by Professor Marcus. 
 211. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 212. Edson R. Sunderland, Current Legal Literature: Among Recent Books, 15 A.B.A. J. 35, 36 (1929). 
 213. It was the only foreign system that Pound named in his 1906 address: “the wonderful mechanism 
of modern German judicial administration.” Pound, supra note 50, at 397. It may be better today. One-
hundred eight years later, the World Justice Project, partly funded and led by the American Bar 
Association, reviewed ninety-nine civil justice systems around the world. THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, 
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014 1 (2014). Of the civil justice systems in the thirty wealthiest countries, the 
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seriously applying law to facts. In a nutshell,214 the following is why it 
works well. 
Parties present facts to courts; courts find facts and determine rights 
under law. The idea is captured in the Latin maxim: da mihi factum, 
dabo tibi jus! (Give me the facts, I will give you your right).215 Process 
does not exist for its own sake. It exists to facilitate determining rights 
under law. 
German process parallels American process in outline, but differs in 
details that facilitate decisions on the merits. 216  Plaintiffs file 
complaints. 217  Courts determine sufficiency of complaints, help 
parties correct insufficient complaints, and direct parties that have 
gone to the wrong courts to the right ones.218 Courts serve complaints 
and the defendants answer.219 Pleadings identify key facts and point to 
evidence parties will rely on.220 
Early on, courts meet with parties—not just lawyers—to discuss 
cases.221 Together they identify applicable law and material facts in 
dispute.222 If no material facts are in dispute, courts may summarily 
decide.223 If material facts are in dispute, courts invite parties to submit 
evidence.224 Parties propose testimony and, if courts agree that the 
evidence proposed would contribute to resolving a material question 
in dispute, they order taking proof.225 Parties have a fully developed 
right to be heard which is fully enforceable on appeal, so courts are 
reluctant to reject proffered proof.226 
                                                                                                                 
Project rated the German system third, behind only those of Norway and the Netherlands. Id. at 95. The 
project scored the U.S. twenty-five percent lower and ranked it twenty-fifth. Id. at 154. 
 214. For an explanation of this system, see MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 52, along with three other 
books and dozens of articles authored by Maxeiner. 
 215. Maxeiner, supra note 3, at 1283. 
 216. Id. at 1280–88. 
 217. Id. at 1285. 
 218. Id. at 1285–86. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Maxeiner, supra note 3, at 1286. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1287. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
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Courts decide nothing finally until they decide the entire case.227 
They may readdress issues that seemed settled.228 They let parties 
know which issues they will be deciding and give parties the 
opportunity to respond. 229  Once courts have clarified all material 
issues in dispute, they proceed to making final decisions.230  They 
explain their decisions in full: they give contentions of both sides and 
explain why they come to the conclusions they do.231 If parties believe 
courts’ decisions are wrong, they may appeal them.232 On first appeal, 
other courts decide which party is right in law and not whether the first 
court failed to follow the rules of the game.233 
German civil justice works because courts decide cases on the 
merits; they apply law to facts. German judges guide parties from the 
commencement of suits. Judges have freedom in structuring the order 
and content of proceedings. Because they control how proceedings go, 
they do not need to limit access to procedure. They are not gatekeepers, 
but facilitators. Courts do not decide issues conclusively until they 
decide the entire case at the end of proceedings. 
Of course, the United States cannot simply adopt the German 
system. Process is not simple. It requires laws, processes, and 
institutions different from those we presently have. But those laws, 
processes, and institutions are of a piece with legal methods Americans 
have for two centuries aspired to as best practices. The United States 
can learn from the German and other foreign systems if only we would 
give them a look. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 227. James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges That Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 114 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 469, 481 (2009). 
 228. See id. 
 229. Id. at 478. 
 230. Id. at 476–81. 
 231. James R. Maxeiner, What America Can Learn From Germany’s Justice System, ATLANTIC (June 
7, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/what-america-can-learn-from-
germanys-justice-system/258208/. 
 232. Maxeiner, supra note 3, at 1282. 
 233. See James R. Maxeiner, Thinking Like A Lawyer Abroad: Putting Justice Into Legal Reasoning, 
11 WASH U. GLOB. STUD. L REV. 55, 85 (2012). 
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B.   Sunderland to Miller, Marcus, and Carrington: “Why don’t you 
take advantage of what has been done by the civil law . . .?” 
Sunderland, in a book review that predated his work on the Federal 
Rules, raised the question: “Why don’t you take advantage of what has 
been done by the civil law, that governs at least twice as many people 
as the common law, is two thousand years older, and embodies a much 
greater amount of human experience?”234 
Professors Miller, Marcus, and Carrington are internationally 
minded men. Yet for them, there are few lessons to be learned abroad. 
Where Sunderland sought out foreign solutions, his successors avert 
their eyes. Where Sunderland saw his work as experiments, 
independent of frontiers, in a universal search for better methods of 
dealing with fundamental problems of litigation, Miller and Carrington 
revere Sunderland’s reforms as immovable and immutable building 
blocks peculiar to American culture.235 
Not to look at foreign solutions is irresponsible. It is foolish. So said 
Sunderland. 236  So how do Miller, Marcus, and Carrington answer 
Sunderland? 
1.   American Exceptionalism 
Americans have long known that through comparison of our 
institutions with those of foreigners, we learn “what is defective or 
excellent, and therefore of what is to be cherished and upheld, or to be 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Sunderland, supra note 212, at 35. 
 235. Carrington, Moths to the Light, supra note 197, at 686 (“It would require deep cultural 
change . . . .”); see Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on 
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 397 (2010) (noting that some 
changes would be “too deep an assault on the historic role of civil litigation in our country”). See generally 
Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM J. COMP. L. 277 (2002) 
(examining the relationships between a society’s culture and dispute resolution methods); see generally 
Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM J. 
COMP. L. 709 (2005) (introducing works that examine the dispute resolution methods in other countries). 
Some American proceduralists are more open to foreign examples. See Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, 
Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 21–23 
(2011); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 444–
45 (2010). 
 236. See infra note 270. 
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disapproved and abolished in our institutions.”237  Those, however, 
who are unwilling to disapprove or even abolish institutions found 
wanting, maintain the failing institutions and assert that they serve 
unique American needs.238 So it is with defenders of the failed Federal 
Rules. 
American civil procedure is exceptional, they say, because its goals 
are exceptional.239 Where foreign systems are concerned only with 
resolving disputes among private parties, the American system relies 
on private parties to enforce public law. This difference, they claim, 
defines the American system.240 Professor Carrington explains: 
[D]iscovery is the American alternative to the administrative state. 
We have by means of Rules 26–37, and by their analogues in state 
law, privatized a great deal of our law enforcement, especially in 
such fields as antitrust and trade regulation, consumer protection, 
securities regulation, civil rights, and intellectual property. Private 
litigants do in America much of what is done in other industrial 
states by public officers working within an administrative 
bureaucracy.241 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Caleb Cushing, On the Study of the Civil Law, 11 N. AM. REV. 407, 408 (1820). 
 238. See generally Marcus, American Exceptionalism, supra note 20 (examining the unique goals of 
American civil litigation). 
 239. Marcus, American Exceptionalism, supra note 20, at 139 (“American procedure is exceptional 
because American procedural goals are exceptional . . . . The goal of public enforcement largely emerged 
after World War II, and there has recently been an effort in the U.S. to discredit the goal of private 
enforcement that seems now to explain so much about American procedure that baffles the rest of the 
world. Not surprisingly, those who challenge the private enforcement goal in the U.S. also seem to want 
to dismantle the procedural apparatus that supports it.”). 
 240. See SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 29, at 37 (“The role of civil litigation in America is somewhat 
different perhaps from its role in other countries, and it defines the character of our legal system. Rather 
than simply seeking courts to resolve private disputes (the conflict resolution model), Americans have 
relied on relatively open access to court and private civil litigation to be at the heart of a great deal of the 
enforcement of our public laws (the behavior modification or social control model). With a mistrust of 
big government and intrusive states, the American public has (probably more than most other countries) 
relied on private civil litigation rather than solely on state-controlled litigation or state regulatory agencies 
to enforce our public values.”). 
 241. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997); accord Carrington, 
American, supra note 201, at 1413; Paul D. Carrington, Civil Procedure to Enforce Transnational Rights?, 
(Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/1990; see generally J. 
Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1137 (2012); Marcus, supra note 235. 
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The story they tell is that because foreign systems do not do these 
things, they do not need American-style pleading and discovery and, 
therefore, there is not much to learn from their procedures in “dispute 
resolution.”242 
The story of American exceptionalism in civil procedure goals is 
fantasy. A recent multinational study, Goals of Civil Justice and Civil 
Procedure in Contemporary Judicial Systems, edited by Alan Uzelac, 
under the aegis of the International Association of Procedural Law, 
explodes the idea of American exceptionalism in goals for civil 
procedure.243 Professor Uzelac, in summarizing the results of eleven 
studies of twelve systems of civil justice, finds in all twelve there to be 
two main goals of civil justice: dispute resolution and social policy.244 
The definitions and relative emphases given to each, especially the 
latter, vary.245 But, there is no escaping the conclusion that the United 
States is not exceptional and that its use of private enforcement of 
social policy does not define our system.246 
2.   Foreign Fact Instead of Exceptionalism Fantasy 
The proponents of American exceptionalism do not offer proof for 
their claims that other states orient civil justice exclusively on dispute 
resolution to the denigration of social policy. Professor Marcus alone 
obliquely states where he got the idea: “For most of the rest of the 
world, we Americans are informed, the administrative enforcement 
model is the favored method of achieving policy enforcement or 
behavior modification, and conflict resolution is the goal of private 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Were these statements true, foreign experiences ought none the less lead Americans to ask: (1) 
should the United States abandon the “transsubstantive model,” one size fits all, of forms of civil 
procedure and substitute a two-track approach, where one track is for dispute resolution and the other for 
social policy?; and (2) is the United States well served by private enforcement through civil justice or are 
there better ways to achieve policy goals? 
 243. See Uzelac, supra note 1. 
 244. Id. at 6. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Although the U.S. system is not exceptional in goals, it is exceptional in its methods: it hands over 
the power of the state to unchecked use by private parties. E. Donald Elliott, Twombly in Context: Why 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) is Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L. REV. 895, 898 (2012). 
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civil litigation.”247 When challenged, he cites his colleagues.248 We 
can only speculate where he or they got the idea. My best guess: pre-
conceptions about the defunct Soviet system.249 
Foreign civil justice determines rights. In this way, it resolves 
conflicts. Foreign civil justice rests on private enforcement of rights.250 
In the case of the German system, it has done this for a century.251 
Private parties more than public officers enforce rights, both those 
found in traditional private law, and those based on newer public law. 
The huge, centralized bureaucracy that American proceduralists 
imagine is not a feature of Germany. Its Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, which oversees the enforcement of employment 
law, social law, the labor courts and the social courts, has about eleven 
hundred employees.252 Its Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection, which oversees enforcement of consumer protection laws 
and the ordinary civil courts, has about seven hundred employees.253 
To put those numbers in perspective, the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts has more than thirty thousand employees.254 
Who, we should ask, has armies of public officials? 
To dispel the notion of American exceptionalism it is sufficient to 
look at some of the areas where exceptionalism is supposedly 
evidenced.255 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Marcus, American Exceptionalism, supra note 20, at 129 (emphasis added). 
 248. Id. at 129–34. 
 249. Perhaps they read too robustly the words of Mirjan Damaška. See generally MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, 
THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 
(1986). Professor Marcus frequently refers to Professor Damaška’s work. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, 
Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World order?, 7 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 187–88 (1999). 
 250. Uzelac, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
 251. See MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 52, app. at 271. 
 252. E-mail from Ralf Peters, Fed. Ministry of Labour and Soc. Affairs, to James R. Maxeiner, Assoc. 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law (Feb. 12, 2014) (on file with author). 
 253. Aufbau und Organisation, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, 
http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Ministerium/AufbauOrganisation/_node.html (last visited June 26, 2014). 
 254. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., DATA, ANALYSIS & DOCUMENTATION FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT 
REPORTS: EMPLOYMENT AND TRENDS—SEPTEMBER 2012 (2012), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/employment-trends-
data/2012/september/table-3/. 
 255. Different writers highlight different areas for mention. Employment law and consumer protection 
are two areas that have not only been mentioned but have received close attention. See Burbank, Farhang 
& Kritzer, supra note 28, at 667. This article was prepared as part of the fourteenth World Congress of 
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1. Employment law. Americans boast that federal courts handle 
yearly 20,000 cases of employment discrimination, mostly termination 
cases.256 Most of these cases in Germany would fall in the jurisdiction 
of state labor courts. They handle 400,000 cases a year.257 The great 
majority of these cases are private suits by employees against 
employers. The state labor courts are civil courts; their rules of 
procedure are those of ordinary civil courts.258 
2. Consumer protection. Private litigation in the ordinary courts is 
the principal locus of enforcement of German laws of consumer 
protection, be they laws protecting consumers against unfair terms, 
product liability, misleading advertising, or deceptive sales 
practices.259 Most of these laws now find counterparts throughout the 
European Union (EU) thanks to EU directives compelling their 
adoption. Under German law, private consumer organizations are 
authorized to send demand letters with the force of law and, if those 
do not cause corporate cessation of consumer damaging practices, to 
bring private suits.260 
                                                                                                                 
the International Association of Procedural Law. Id. at 637 n.a1. It focuses on two areas of private 
enforcement: employment law and protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive acts and practices. Id. 
at 643. 
 256. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1323 
n.233 (2009). 
 257. Until recently, Germany did not have a specific discrimination law. Joachim Wiemann, Obligation 
to Contract and the German General Act on Equal Treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), 
11 GERMAN L.J. 1131, 1131 (2010). Nevertheless German labor courts have long handled matters that in 
America would be raised as job discrimination. Since the U.S. has no general employment law, but instead 
applies a common law “employment at will” doctrine, plaintiffs who would bring unlawful discharge suits 
in Germany assert discrimination in employment. See Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 169, at 343 
n.210. 
 258. See MANFRED WEISS & MARLENE SCHMIDT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
GERMANY 149 (4th ed. 2008). For perspectives specifically on German labor courts and proceedings,  
see generally JÜRG ARNOLD, DIE ARBEITSGERICHTSBARKEIT: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 100-JÄHRIGEN 
BESTEHEN DES DEUTSCHEN ARBEITSGERICHTSVERBANDES (1994); EBERHARD WIESER,  
ARBEITSGERICHTSVERFAHREN (1994); and still valuable and insightful, Ernst Fraenkel, The Labor Courts 
in the German Judicial System, in GERMAN LABOR COURTS 3–18 (1946). 
 259. See BARBARA GRUNEWALD & KARL-NIKOLAU PEIFER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ IM ZIVILRECHT 7–
10 (2010) (with an introduction and ten chapters each on a different form of consumer protection detailing 
its implementation); Stefan Lenze, German Product Liability Law: Between European Directives, 
American Restatements and Common Sense, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 100–
25 (Duncan Fairgrieve ed., 2005). 
 260. JAMES R. MAXEINER & PETER SCHOTTHÖFER, ADVERTISING LAW IN EUROPE AND NORTH 
AMERICA 228–32 (2d ed. 1999) (including a chapter on German law by George Jennes & Peter 
Schotthöfer); James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European 
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3. Competition and antitrust law. The former relies almost 
exclusively on private enforcement,261 while the latter, modeled on 
American law, includes a significant private enforcement 
component.262 
4. Private rights of action in civil courts under public law. 
American proceduralists admire those oft-confusing and sometimes 
inconsistent precedents that permit private rights of action pursuant to 
New Deal (1930s) and subsequent legislation. The German Civil Code 
has anticipated such actions since its adoption in 1896. Section 828(2) 
provides that a person has a duty to pay damages is “held by a person 
who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to protect another 
person.”263 
By studying these and other areas where private parties enforce 
public law through civil justice, Americans would learn how the 
German system has minimized the difficulties encountered here.264 
The German approach is straight-forward. Civil justice is limited to 
enforcing rights that are already determined in law or determinable 
based on facts limited to the individuals concerned. Those rights may 
originate in private or public law. Where, however, law application 
requires policy decisions, i.e., political decisions for people beyond 
those immediately concerned, then administrative decision-making, 
with eventual political responsibility is appropriate and private 
enforcement through ordinary courts is not. Private challenges are still 
possible. They go first to the administrative authorities themselves, 
whose decisions are then are reviewable by administrative courts.265 
                                                                                                                 
Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 157–59 (2003). 
 261. See generally LAW AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN EUROPE? 
(Reto M. Hilty & Frauke Henning-Bodewig eds., 2007) (examining the evolution of competition laws in 
Europe); THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE (Thomas M. J. Möllers & Andreas 
Heinemann eds., 2007) (analyzing the enforcement mechanisms of unfair competition law and antitrust 
law). 
 262. DAVID ALEXANDER JÜNTGEN, DIE PROZESSUALE DURCHSETZUNG PRIVATER ANSPRÜCHE IM 
KARTELLRECHT passim (2007); MAXEINER, supra note 259, at 55. 
 263. See BÉNÉDICTE FAUVARQUE-COSSON & DENIS MAZEAUD, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: 
MATERIALS FOR A COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE: TERMINOLOGY, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, MODEL 
RULES 489 n.175 (2008). 
 264. Professor Burbank and colleagues set out those difficulties in their recent article on private 
enforcement. Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 28, at 667. 
 265. MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 219–22 
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CONCLUSION 
Sunderland named two principal reasons why Americans do not 
learn from foreign civil justice: “ignorance, due to the fact that 
American lawyers are not usually good linguists,” and “professional 
prejudice against new ideas, based on natural conservatism and the 
monopolistic nature of judicial agencies.”266 
Limited facility with foreign languages remains an impediment,267 
but one of ever declining importance as the English-speaking 
European Union harmonizes and reforms its laws. One consequence 
of that harmonizing is an explosion of English language materials by 
foreign experts. 268  That literature, some scholarly, some practical, 
offers American scholars a firm basis on which to write. If only one of 
ten new scholars would put aside the U.S. judicial clerkships for 
serious foreign law studies abroad—preferably in the local language—
we would soon have sufficient institutional knowledge to well utilize 
foreign law.269 
Professional prejudice is another matter. It is simply stupid to ignore 
foreign successes because they are foreign. So thought Sunderland.270 
So said famously the German, Rudolf von Jhering: 
                                                                                                                 
(2d ed. 2001). 
 266. Sunderland, supra note 212, at 35. 
 267. Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why are U.S. Lawyers not Learning From Comparative 
Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 213–36 (Nedim Peter Vogt et al. eds., 1997). 
 268. This offers a niche for U.S. law professors who do not know foreign languages. Since these foreign 
scholars do not know U.S. law, their work needs “translation” into American legal understanding. 
 269. This would address Professor Clermont’s claim that we cannot use foreign experiences because 
knowledge of foreign systems is too little diffused. See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-
Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1343 n.36 (2010). 
 270. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571, 572 (1920) (“There is 
further striking failure which must be charged to the legal profession in America . . . and that is its 
ignorance of and indifference to improvements in procedural practice developed in other jurisdictions. It 
is safe to say that if a new method of treating cancer were discovered and successfully employed in 
England, every intelligent doctor in the world would almost immediately know about it and attempt to 
take advantage of it. But it is equally safe to say that if a new and successful method of treating some 
procedural problem were discovered in England, American lawyers as a class would remain in substantial 
ignorance of it for at least two generations, and would probably treat it with scornful indifference for a 
generation or two more. There are no state lines for progressive doctors, dentists, engineers, architects, 
manufacturers or business men. But not one lawyer in a hundred knows or cares what reforms are being 
employed by his profession on the other side of the political boundary. The American lawyer is satisfied 
with things as they are. As long as clients continue to come and the machinery of the law continues to 
move, he is . . . free from concern over the methods used elsewhere . . . .”). 
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The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of 
nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a 
thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, but 
only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his 
back yard.271 
Let us follow Sunderland’s invocation and “search[] for new and 
better methods, overcoming the barriers of language and forgetting the 
prejudices of nationality and race.”272 Then we may be able to avoid 
the tragedy that Chief Justice Burger warned of at the 1976 Pound 
Conference: 
It is far easier to do what we lawyers often do—praise our system 
as the best ever devised and denounce anyone who dares to 
suggest that we consider, not only periodic adjustment, but major 
and systemic changes. The inertia of some lawyers, judges, and 
legislators is such that nothing less than a collapse of the system 
will bring them to consider change.273 
	  
                                                                                                                 
 271. RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN 
SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 8–9 (Basel, B. Schwabe, 1953), as translated in K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 16 (Tony Weir, trans., 2d ed. 1992). 
 272. Sunderland, supra note 212, at 35. 
 273. Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 79, 89 
(1976). 
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